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A fragile  political-macroeconomic  equilibrium  is bound  to re-
sult in high inflation in the transition from socialism. The
collapse of growth in Bulgaria is the result of cuts  in oil deliveries
from the Soviet Union and Iraq, domestic dislocation  in the
supply  of inputs  following  the dismantling  of central  planning,
and the contraction  of the Soviet  market.
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Bulgaria's shaky macroeconomic situation is a  least two major problems at a micro level.  First,
serious obstacle for a smooth transition from  the rules of operation for firms in the productive
central planning to markets.  It has to correct  sphere are still dominated by enterprises operat-
large current account deficits with the convert-  ing under soft budget constraints - with little
ible currency area.  It also has to eliminate  price responsiveness.  Second, in a setting of
inflationary pressures and large price distortions.  monopolistic competition, where individual
And it has to get into a path of suv-^inable  firms have considerable market power, full price
growth.  deregulation may reduce output.
The links between inflation, money velocity,  Bulgaria's moves toward a market economy
the money overhang, and the fiscal deficit are  are likely to affect growth through several
crucial for assessing probable inflationary trends  channels. The correction of macroeconomic
in Bulgaria.  SQlimano  shows that with con-  imbalances - cutting imports and cooling
trolled prices and financial reprcssion, low  aggregate demand to dampen inflationary
velocity keeps inflation at an artificially low  pressures - will contract aggregate economic
level despite large fiscal deficits.  But as prices  activity. Reforms of the incentive structure will
are deregulated and the financial sector is  make part of the capital stock economically
reformed, velocity can be expected to increase  obsolete, hampering productive capacity in the
- due to expectations of higher inflation and  short run.  The response of private investment to
financial innovation.  the new incentives will be highly sensitive to
macroeconomic stability and the perceiv~d
Solimano uses cost-determined price equa-  probability that the reform process will last and
tions to explore the effects on domestic prices of  consolidate.  Otherwise, private investors will
a devaluation of the leva and an increase in the  wait before acting, delaying the resumption of
price of foreign inputs imported from the Soviet  growth.  Given these impediments, extemal
Union and other CMEA countries. The input  support in the fonn of new financing and direct
price shock has a bigger effect on intemal prices  investment will play a major role in consolidat-
than does an equivalent devaluation.  ing the reform and in the resumption of growth.
The supply response to changes in relative
prices and market incentives is likely to face at
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APPENDIX
*  Helpful  comments  made  by B. Balassa,  R. Caballero,  V. Corbo,  0. Havrylyshyn,
M. Kiguel,  N. Liviatan,  C.  Michalopoulos,  R.  Rocha  and  J. Wilton  to a previous
version  of this  paper  are  appreciated.1.  Introduction
The  transiti  i  from  central  planning  to a  market-based  economy  in
Bulgaria  will be a  complex  process. On top  of the  structural  problems
inherited  from  decades  of running  the  economy  over  strictly  orthodox  central
planning  lines,  the  economy  faces  now also  severe  macroeconomic  imbalances,  a
feature  that  obviously  complicates  the  transition.  Economic  growth  in
Bulgaria  has decelerated  sharply  in the  last  four  years  and  started  to turn
negative  in 1989  turning  to a definite  collapse  in 1990  with an additional
drop in output  of the  order  of -10Z. External  debt  is a serious  problem  as
Bulgaria  more than  doubled  its foreign  debt  in a few  years  (1985-1989)  and
currently  its  servicing  is suspended  for  both  principal  and  interest  payments;
moreover,  the  economy  is in a critical  need  of foreign  exchange  to  keep it
running,  let  alone  the servicing  of its  foreign  debt. Domestic  inflation
started  to accelerate  in  1990  as prices  are  being  deregulated,  though  near 85
percent  of prices  remain  still  under  government  control. In last  May the
domestic  currency  --  the leva  --  was devalued  and  a two  tier  exchange  tate
system  was established  for  current  account  transactions.  The  fiscal  situation
is  bound  to deteriorate  significantly  as a consequence  of the  devaluation  of
the  leva  besides  of the  effect  of pending  increases  in current  spending.
Furthermore,  on the  external  front,  Bulgaria  is expected  to face  a
deterioration  in its  terms  of trade  particularly  with the  Soviet  Union  --
Bulgaria's  main trade  partner  --  as by January  1991  the  subsidies  given  to oil
and  other  products  that  the  USSR  exports  to Bulgaria  (and  other  CMEA
countries)  will be eliminated.
The  paper  is  organized  as follows. Section  2  provides  a  background  on
the structural  features  of the  Bulgarian  economy  and  its  current  macroeconomic
situation. In section  3  we provide  a simple  framework  to link  fiscal2
deficits,  the  money  overhang,  inflation  and  the  real  exchange  rate  in the
process  of restoring  internal  and  external  balance  and  eliminating  repressed
inflation. Section  3.1  provides  a numerical  exercise  related  to the
monetization  of fiscal  deficits,  money  velocity  and  the rate  of inflation  in a
context  where  prices  are  being  decontrolled.  The sensitivity  of inflation  to
different  degrees  of velocity  is examined  as  well as the issue  of setting
fiscal  targets  for  anti-inflationary  purposes. There  we caution  on the  impact
of financial  deregulation  on money-velocity  durin,  disinflation.  Then  in
section  4  we look  at the inflationary  process  from  the  cost side  and  assess
the  impact  of two shocks  on domestic  pricest  a devaluation  of the  leva  and  an
increase  in  the  price  of inputs  imported  from  the  CMEt.  zone (particularly  from
the  Soviet  Union). For that  purpose  a cost-based  model  of price  determination
is constructed  and subsequently  parameterized  using  the information  provided
by an input-output  table  available  for  1987. The simulation  of the  price
effects  of those  shocks  is  carried  out  under  alternative  assumptions  regarding
the  degrees  of (formal  or informal)  wage indexation.
Section  5 discusses  the  determinants  of growth  in  the 1980s  in Bulgaria
looking  both  at supply  (factor  accumulation)  and  demand  factors. Furthermore,
we deal  with the  issue  of the  level  and  efficiency  of investment  and  provide
also  a decomposition  of growth  from  the  demand  side. Moreover,  the factors
behind  the  huge  drop in output  during  1990  are spelled-out.  Then the
discussion  turns  to the  issue  of supply  response  to incentives  at  micro  level
highlighting  the role  of the  enforcement  of budget  constraints  and  the  market
structure  in  getting  supply  response  from  changes  in incentives. The section
ends-up  discussing  the  impact  on economic  growth  of supply  shocks,  demand
restraint,  private  investment  response,  resource  reallocation  and  external3
financing  during  the  transition  from  socialism. The  paper  concludes  in
section  6.
2.  The  Bulgarian  Economy:  A Brief  Back%round
The  Bulgarian  economy  is in  a process  of transformation  from  central-
planning,  the system  adopted  after  World-War  II following  the  lines  of the
Soviet  model.  From an agrarian  economy  until  the  World  War Ill  Bulgaria
industrialized  under  strong  prominence  of  heavy  industry. The  pattern  of
industrialization  was defined  according  to  the  needs  of the  Soviet  Union  and
some  criteria  of *comparative  advantages"  within  the  CMEA zone. 2 The
importance  of the  industrial  sector  is clearly  dominant. In the  1980s  over
602  of GDP,  on average,  was generated  in industry. The agricultural  sector,
dominant  before  socialism,  shrunk  sharply  in relative  terms  under  the
socialist  systems  its  share  in  GDP  went down  from  632  in the  late  1930s  to 132
in 1989.  Public  property  is overwhelming  in Bulgaria  and  near 97 percent  of
GDP is generated  in the  socialist  sector. The  allocation  of resources  under
socialism  was carried  out  through  quantity  targets  and  direct  inputs
allocation. Central  planning  involved  a complex  interaction  of planning
bodies,  holdings  of firms  and economic  councils. The  Bulgarian  economy  was
able  to sustain  a high rate  of  growth  of the  Net  Material  Product,  NMP,  of the
order )f  7-8  percent  per year  between  1945  and  1975,  according  to the  official
statistics.  This growth  record  was  heavily  concentrated  in industry,  mostly
1  See  Solimano  1990(b)  for  a  historical  account  of the  economies  of  Eastern
Europe  before  socialism.
2  Import competition  from the West was  completely  curtailed through
prohibitive  tariffs.4
Droducing  c'pital  goods;  In addition,  the  sector  of consumption  durable  and
services-relatec  ictivities  lagged  well behind  the  capital  goods  sector.
Central  planners  --  as in  other  socialist  economies  --  seemed  to have followed
a  policy  of  maximizing  the  rate  of growth  of  output  through  maintaining  a very
high investment  rate (over  35  percent  of GDP in  Bulgaria). Drawing  welfare
implications  from  the  growth  strategy  followed  in Bulgaria  is not  easy,  though
it is apparent  that  keeping  such  high investment  ratios  tends  to depress  the
growth  rate  of per-capita  consumption  thus  preventing  further  improvement  in
the  standard  of living  of the  population.  Also the  problem  of the  quality  of
the  goods  produced  --  particularly  in the  produiction  of consumption  durable  --
is  certainly  not captured  in the  figures  on GDP or  NMP growth.  However,
regarding  social  sectors  Bulgaria  shows  indicators  of high  birth  expectancy,
low  infant  mortality,  access  to and  completion  of general  education  that  are
among  the  highest  of Eastern  Europe.5
Table  1  Bulaaria  --  Selected  Macroeconomic  Indicators
GDP  Investment Inflat..',n  Honey  Current  External
(growth (1  of  GDP)  (rate  of  Supply  Account  Debt
rate,  Z)  change,Z) (M1,S  (convo.  .rr,  Millions
of  Grt)  of  U.S  dollars)
1981  4.90  35.40  2.82  38. 41a
1985  2.70  32.20  0.24  36.38  49.00  3940.00
1986  4.20  35.90  1.34  39.67  -715.00  5218.00
1987  6.10  32.90  0.07  43.74  -773.00  7082.00
1988  2.60  34.80  2.29  45.59  -840.00  8892.00
1989  -1.90  29.50  4.41  47.66  -1306.00  10223.00
1990  -10.00  70.00
e/
Sources  The  World  Babk.
notess  e/  preliminary  estimates.  Inflation  is  measured  by  the  rate  of  change
in  the  GDP  deflator.The  current  account  and  external  debt  is  with  the
convertible  currency  area.  a:l982.
The  macroeconomic  performance  of  Bulgaria  deteriorated  since  the  mid-
1980s.  GDP  growth  slowed  down,  turning  negative  in  1989,  and  the  estimates
for  1990  are  even  worse  than  for  1989. Open  inflation  was  very  low,  though
shortages  in  goods  and  inputs  markets,  provides  indication  of  the  existence  of
repressed  inflation  in  the  system.  Since  1989  signs  of  an  acceleration  of
inflation  started  to  appear  and  that  tendency  got  sharper  in  1990  (see  next
two  sections).  On  the  monetary  side  the  data  show  very  high  -- and  increasing
--  ratios  of  Ml  over  GDP;  in  1988-89  that  ratio  hovered  around  45-50  percent6
of GDP,  a number  exceedingly  high for  the  standards  of  aon-socialist
economies. However,  this  is consistent  with the alleged  existence  of a  money
owerhang. It is also  worth  noting  that  in  the last  five  years  the  ratio  of  Ml
over  GDr  has grown. Money  has grcwn  faster  than  output  in this  period  due  to
money financing  of  widening  fiscal  deficits.  On the  external  sector,  one
important  development  of the  last  five  years  is the  increase  in the  current
account  deficlt  with the  convertible  currency  area  reflecting  growing  trade
delicits  and  increased  interest  payments  on foreign  debt. 3 Those  deficits
were financed,  mainly,  by an increase  in external  borrowing. In fact,  the
external  debt  of Bulgaria  increased  2.5  times  between  1985  and  1989.  This
impressive  increase  in external  liabilities  concentrated  mainly  with
commercial  banks  in  West Germany,  Japan,  the  United  Kingdom  and  Austria.
Finally,  by mid-1990  the  macroeconomic  situation  severely  worsened. GDP
is expected  to fall  this  year  by 10 percent,  and  open  inflation  is
accelerating. The  government  devalued  the  Leva  in  May 1990  and  the fiscal
situation  --  including  the  Quasi-Fiscal  deficit  of the  Foreign  Trade  Bank  and
the  National  Bank  of Bulgaria  --  deteriorated  sharply  (on  an accrual  basis)  as
a consequence  of the  adjustments  in  the  exchange  and in  other  outstanding
expenditures. Furthermore,  on the servicing  of external  debt,  the  country  is
in arrears  of both  principal  and interests  since  April  and its  level  of
international  reserves  is  meager.
3  The  foreign  trade  of  Bulgaria  with the  convertible  currency  area  amounts
near 25  percent  of its total  external  trade.7
3.  Macroeconomic  Imbalances  and  Stabilization  in the  Transition  From
Socialisms  A Framework
The  transition  from  central  planning  to a  market  based  economy  may
involve  hard  policy  choices  on the  macro  side  in an economy  starting  the
transition  with large  macroecornomic  imbalances. In the  case  of  Bulgaria  at
least  three  macro  imbalances  need urgent  corrections
* The  deficit  in the  current  account  with th;  convertible  currency  area
has to  be reduced.
* The  fiscal  deficit  is  too  high,  near  5.5  percent  of GDP in  1990;  in
addition,  the  quasi-fiscal  deficit  was of the  order  of 4Z in  that  year.
- There  is still  repressed  inflation  and  a large  money  overhang.
A reduction  in the  current  account  deficit  is  needed  to adjust  the
economy  to the  level  of external  financing  available  for  Bulgaria  on a more
sustained  basis. Moreover,  further  adverse  external  shocks  are looming.
Starting  in  January  1991,  the  Soviet  Union  will charge  its  deliveries  of oil,
natural  gad,  and  raw  materials  to Bulgaria  in  hard  currency  and at
international  prices. In addition,  currently,  oil  prices  are  soaring  because
of the  Gulf crisis. Fiscal  adjustment  is required  for  several  reasons:  to
improve  the  current  account  of the  balance  of  payments,  to reduce  inflationary
pressures  and  to release  resources  to the  traded  gcods  sector  that  need to
expand. The  latter  is important,  if th  external  constraint  facing  Bulgaria
is to be relaxed  on a  more permanent  basis.
An important  part  of the  adjustment  process  in the  transition  from  a
centrally  planned  economy,  is  the  deregulation  of controlled  prices. Price
deregulation  is further  complicated  because  of the  existence  of a money
overhang  resulting  from  chronic  shortages  in the  goods  market  and repressedfinancial  markets.  From  a  macroeconomic  perspectivte  a eoasic  concern  is  how  to
avoid  an  acceleration  of  inflation  that  may  be  of  a  big  magnitude  and
protracted  when  prices  are  deregulated.  Let  us  present  a  simple  formal
setting  to  deal  with  these  issues 4. The  goods  market  equilibrium  can  be
written  as  the  equality  of  full  capacity  output,  YP,  and  aggregate  demand,  AD,
where  AD  is  a  function  of  the  real  exchange  rate,  er,  and  the  ratio  of  fiscal
deficit  over  GDP,  d.
(1) YP  - AD(  er,  d)
The  current  account  of  the  balance  of  payments,  CA,  is  a function  if  the
real  exchange  rate,  the  fiscal  deficit  ratio and  L vector,  f,  of  foreign*
variables  like  external  terms  of  trade,  foreign  real  interest  rates,  and  net
capital  inflows.
(2)  CA  - CA( er,  d,  f)
The  rate  of  inflation  is  assumed  to  depend  on  the  ratio  of  fiscal
deficit  to  GDP  and  on /elocity  of  circulation  of  money,  V.  This  relationship
is  obtained  from  the  a*sumption  that  all  the  fisral  deficit  is  financed  from
the  inflation  tax. In  a  stationary  equilibrium  (zero  growth)s
(3)  f(M/P)  - dY
where  f  is  the  rate  of  inflation,and  M/P  is  the  stock  of  real  balances
(the  nominal  stock  of  money,  M,  divided  by  the  price  level,  P). Solving  for
the  rate  of  inflation,  equation  (3)  can  be  expressed  ast
(4)  V - V d
where  V (-  PY/M)  is  money-velocity.  The  syaL  X  provided  by (1),  and  (2)  is
represented  in  figure  1  in  tae  plane  real  exchange  rate  and  fiscal  deficit
4  This  model  is  adapted  from  Dornbusch  (1982)  and  Solimano  (1984)  for  the
case  of  an  economy  with  price  controls  and  repressed  inflation.9
ratio. The  upward  sloping  schedule  CA represents  combinations  of er and  d
that  are  consistent  with equilibrium  in the  current  account. 5 An increase  in
the fiscal  deficit  ratio  increases  domestic  demand  and imports. In order  to
restore  equilibrium  in  the  current  account  the real  exchange  ratt  must
depreciate,  giving  rise  to  an upward  sloping  schedule. The downward  sloping  r
locus  GG represent  goods  market  equilibriums  a real  depreciation  of the
exchange  rate  generates  an increase  in  net  exports  that  require  a reduction  in
absorption  --  through  a cut  in d --  in order  to equilibrate  aggregate  demand
with full  capacity  output.
Figure  2 represents  a positive,  non-linear,  relationship  between  fiscal
deficits  and inflation,  given  money  velocity  (equation  (4)]. Here  a
distinction  is  made between  *virtual,  inflation  (that  is,  the  rate  of
inflation  ruling  in the  absence  of generalized  price  controls)  and *observed'
(official)  inflation  represented  by the  horizontal  line  in  Figure  2: the  rate
of inflation  observed  when generalized  price  controls  are  binding. 6 In  turn,
th.e  difference  between  'virtual"  inflation  --  the  non-linear  schedule  --  and
the  rate  of inflation  under  price  controls  is termed  as the  degree  of
*repressed'  inflation  in  the  sletem. It is  worth  noting  also  that  changes  in
velocity  of circulation  will shift  the 'virtual'  inflation  schedule,  and  given
a set  of price  controls  will change  the  degree  of repressed  inflation  in the
system.
/
5 External  balance could be redefined  also as a certain (financeable)
positive  deficit  in the  current  account  rather  than  as a zero  deficit.
6 The  rate  of inflation  need  Aot  be necessarily  zero  since  not  all  prices
are  controlled  and  fixed.10
Point  A in figure  1 denotes  an initial  position  where  equilibrium  in the
goods  market  takes  place  along  with a deficit  in the  current  account  deficit
(internal  and  external  balance  is at  E).  In this  case  the  restoration  of
external  and internal  b-lance,  moving  the  economy  from  A to E, requires  a
combination  of reduction  in the  fiscal  deficit  along  with a real  depreciation
of the  exchange  rate.  In  Figure  2 the fiscal  adjustment  required  to restore
macro  equilibrium  will reduce  "virtual"  inflation  in  the  medium  run.  Besides
as the system  of price  controls  at excess  den.and  levels  is relaxed  (as  part of
the  transition  to a  market  economy),  inflation  will go up.  Prices  will
increase  due to  the  validation  of repressed  inflation,  hence  eliminating  the
gap  between  virtual  and  observed  inflation.
The adjustment  process  may get  a further  inflationary  bias due  to tne
behavior  of  money-velocity.  A reduction  in the  demand  for  money (increase  in
velocity)  may take  place  for  two  reasonst first,  the  public  may anticipate  an
increase  in inflation  as a consequence  of the  abandoning  of the  system  of
price  controls  at excess  demand  levels 7. Second,  it can  be expected  that  as
part of the  reforms  to the  market  economy  a  wider  menu of financial  assets
will be available  as capital  market  start  to be developed. Hence  financial
innovation  will shift  the  demand  for  money  and  increase  velocity.  Nonetheless,
the  inflationary  impact  of an increase  in  velocity  is  basically  a transitional
problem: in the  medium-run,  the  rate  of inflation  will  be determined  by the
level  of the fiscal  deficit  and  the (sustainable)  level  of the  demand  for
money (inverse  of  velocity).
7 Formally  we may assume  perfect  foresight  and make velocity  a positive
function  of actual  inflation,  V=V(f),  V'>0.11








Inflation,  Fiscal  Deficit,  and  Price  Controls
I  (v l )
inflation  (V)  (virtual  inflation








dE  dA  fiscal  deficit  ratio
goods  market  equilibrium  GG:  y  - AD (d,  er)
current  account  CA:  CA - CA (d,  ern  f)
('virtual')  inflation  rate  r  =  exp {V,  d)12
3.1  Inflation,  Fiscal  Deficit  and  Velocity:  A Numerical  Example
In this  section  we illustrate  the  conceptual  framework. The  exercise
aims  to  provide  a quantitative  sense  of the sensitivity  of inflation  to
changes  in the fiscal  deficit  ratio  and the  ratio  of base  money  to GDP. As we
shall  see  below  the  exercise  suggests  that  a slide  into  very  high inflation
rates  following  price  decontrol  is  not an  unlikely  outcome  in an economy  with
a  high fiscal  deficit  ratio  of GDP  and  with changing  velocity:
Table  2.  Annual  inflation  rate  under  different  velocity
assumptions.High  fiscal  deficit  case
(fiscal  deficit  ratio,  FD/GDP-  0.10)
Ratio  of  base  money  to GDP,  2  rate  of inflation











Note:  The  approximation  r=Vd  for  the  rate  of inflation  will lead  to  misleading
results  at  moderate  and  high  rates  of inflation. Thus  the  continuous  time
formulation  r= exp{Vdt  is  used  to generate  Tables  2 and  3.13
Assuming  that,  initially,  the  deficit  financed  by printing  money is 10  percent
of GDP  and  that  velocity  is 2.0 (associated  with a ratio  of  MI to  GDP  of 50
percent  a number  relevant  for  Bulgaria,  see  Table  1).  For these  values  of the
parameters  --  velocity  and  the  fiscal  deficit  ratio  --  the  rate  of inflation
would  be 22.14  percent  per  year.  That  number  looks  "low"  provided  a fiscal
deficit  of 102  of GDP fully  financed  by printing  money.  Clearly  the impact  of
the  deficit  on inflation  is  dampened  by a low  level  of  velocity  (associated
with a  high  money  GDP ratio). However,  this  situation  is  bound  to change  (for
the reasons  given  above)  as price  controls  are lifted. Table  2 shows  that  the
rate  of inflation  is  highly  sensitive  to reductions  in the  demand  for  money  or
increases  in  velocity. In  particular,  as the  ratio  of  money  to output
declines  (velocity  increases)  inflation  goes  up sharply. Incidentally,
inflation  will reach  three  digits  levels  when the  ratio  of  Ml over  GDP falls
below  152  given  a fiscal  deficit  ratio  of 10.  Two important  conclusions  for
designing  stabilization  policies  emerge: first,  the  increase  in  velocity  may
greatly  complicate  the task  of stabilization  and  price  decontrol  and second,
the  fiscal  deficit  needs  to  be sharply  reduced  if a low, (virtual)  inflation
equilibrium  is to be achieved  in  an economy  with deregulated  prices 8.
Table  3 performs  the  same  exercise  but  assuming  that  the  fiscal  deficit
is reduced  to 3 percent  of GDP.
8 Of course  some  prices  may still  be regulated  by the state  in a market
economy: typically,  the  price  of  public  utilities,  minimum  wages  and  very  often
the  nominal  exchange  rate.14
Table  3  Annual  rate  of inflation  under  different  velocity
assumptions.  Lower  fiscal  deficit  case
(fiscal  deficit  ratio,  FD/GDP  - 0.03)
ratio  of  base  money  to  GDP,Z  rate  of inflation











This  second  exercise  shows  that  the  reduction  of the  fiscal  deficit  from  10 Z
to 3X of GDP reduces  sharply  the (virtual)  rate  of inflation  for  a given  level
of  velocity. Thus,  fiscal  adjustment  is certainly  a necessary  condition  for
getting  inflation  down. However,  as it  could  be anticipated,  inflationary
expectations  and  credibility  are  of  key importance  to  decelerate  actual
inflation. In terms  of our  exercises  a low  confidence  scenario  would  be
associated  with high  velocity;  conversely  a high  confidence  scenario  is
associated  with relatively  low  velocity.
Besides,  we mentioned  before  it is  important  to  have in  mind that
velocity  and  the structure  of the  demand  for  money  will depend  also  on the
reforms  being  implemented  in financial  markets  as part  of the  structural
reforms  towards  the  market  economy. Particularly,  ther0  is  need for  caution
in the speed  and  timing  of liberalization  of capital  markets  and  the  rate  at15
which  new  assets, substitutes  of  money,  are  introduced  in the  system. The
results  here show  that  changes  in  velocity--resulting  greatly  from "financial
innovation"  --  can  seriously  jeopardize  the  stabilization  effort. Deep
financial  liberalization  in the  wake of a stabilization  effort  could  produce
undesirable  results. Better  stabilize  first.
Another  issue  that  deserve  some  discussion  is  that  of defining  the
required  fiscal  adjustment,  particularly  the setting  of the target  fiscal
deficit. That target  will depend  on: (i)  the level  of inflation  that  the
authorities  consider  tolerable  on efficiency  and stability  grounds  and (ii)
the  value  of velocity  and  the  level  of the  demand  for  money (as  a ratio  of
GDP)  that is  expected  to  prevail  in the  medium-run. The  international
evidence  might  be relevant  at this  point.  In chronic  inflation  countries
(typically  Latin  America  and  Israel),  a rate  of inflation  in the  threshold  of
15-20  percent  per  year is often,  implicitly,  considered  as "tolerable"  by the
authorities;  moreover,  below  that  levels  the  cost  of reducing  an extra
percentage  point  of inflation,  in terms  of lower  output,  may  be too  large  for
governments  to find  worth  trying  that  additional  disinflation.  On the  other
hand,  in Ea^.t  Asia and in  OECD  countries,  inflation  tends  to be in the  one
digit  range. What is going  to be the long-run  rate  of inflation  in former
socialist  economies  is still  an open  question.
3.2  The  Monetary  Overhang
The  problem  of the  monetary  overhang  has to be tackled  in some  way.  The
risk  of an explosion  in  prices  following  deregulation  of price  in  conditions
of excessive  liquidity  is  a real  r.:sk.  The  alternatives  to soak  excessive
liquidity  ares i)  a  monetary  reform  that  reduces  the stock  of nominal16
balances,  2) let  prices  to get  rid  of  excessive  real  balances,  3) the  issuance
of a bond  to reduce  liquidity  and  4)  privatization.  The  alternative  of
letting  prices  to go  up an  wipe-out  excess  liquidity  runs  the risk  of not
stopping  in a once  and  for  all  increase  in the  price  level. In  practice  a
protracted  period  of inflation  because  of  monetary  accommodation  and/or
indexation  may follow  an initial  jump  in  prices. In general,  the  less  the
social  support  to a stabilization  program,  the  more likely  government  will
avoid  paying  the  cost  of a fall  in activity  levels  associated  with  non-
accommodative  policies,  and  therefore  the  more likely  a slide  into  protracted
inflation.
The  issuance  of a government  bond  to absorb  liquidity  has the  difficulty
that  the real  interest  rate  to be paid  to induce  asset  holders  to acquire  the
bond  may be very  high in  a context  of uncertainty  and  lack  of credibility. In
addition,  if  the size  of  the  money overhang  is large  the  debt  burden  for  the
government  will be large. Besides,  it is  unclear  that  the  government  should
start  stabilization  with additional  public  debt  that  will strain  public
finances  as  prospective  primary  surpluses  will  have to be generated  to serve
interest  payments  on the  bond.
The  alternative  of  privatization  is  attractive  as it serves  the  purpose
of reducing  the  role  of the  state  in the  production  process  and  also to
eliminate  excessive  liquidity. However,  privatization  will be necessarily  a
slow  process  and  the  money  overhang  is  a pressing  problem  whose solution  can
not  be postponed  over  time.
Finally,  the  alternative  of  monetary  reform  may take  different
modalities  in  practice. A crucial  issue  is that  its  implementation  requires
political  support  as it  will entail  a tax  on  part  of the  wealth  of the17
population. 9
4.  Exchange  Rate  Adiustment  and  Foreign  Price  Shocks:  Impact  on Domestic
Prices
This section  extends  the  analysis  on the  effects  of  macro  policies  and
external  shocks  on domestic  prices. The focus  now is  on the  cost side  of the
economy. The  Bulgarian  economy  in 1990  devalued  the  exchange  rate (the  leva
price  of the  US dollar  increased  substantially  in early  May) and  its  full
impact  on domestic  prices  seems  have  not  yet occurred. In addition,  Bulgaria
faces  the  increase  in  oil  prices  related  to the  Gulf  crises  and  the
realignment  of  prices  towards  international  levels  in the  CMEA  countries,
particularly  in the  Soviet  Union. Thus,  currency  devaluation  and  the increase
in the  price  of imported  raw  materials  and intermediate  inputs  are likely  to
have an impact  on domestic  prices  whose  magnitude  is  worth  exploring.
For  that  purpose  we construct  cost  determined  price  equations  in terms
of direct  and  indirect  value  added  and  imported  inputs  from  the  convertible
and  non-convertible  currency  areas. Moreover,  the  simulation  of the  impact  on
domestic  prices  of currency  devaluation  and  the  increase  in the  price  of
impcrted  inputs  are  carried-out  under  different  assumptions  regarding  wage
indexation. Let  us provide  analytical  background  for  these  calculations  by
starting  with a  production  function  F(.)  where  the  level  of output,  Y [=F(.)],
is  produced  with domestic  value  added,  VA,  and  two  kinds  of imported  inputs
which  are  not perfect  substitutes  and  therefore  cannot  be aggregated  into  a
single  composite. Those  inputs  aret  M1, namely  inputs  from  the  convertible
9 See Gurley (1953)  and Dornbusch  and Wolf (1990)  for analysis  on the
historical  experience  on  monetary  reform  in  post-world  wvr II  Europe.18
currency  zone  and  M2  inputs  from  the  CEMA  area.
(1)  Y =  F(VA,  M1, M2)
We will assume  positive  first  partial  derivatives  and  negative  aecond
partial  derivatives  with respect  to  variable  inputs. Unitary  costs,  c(.),
will be a function  of the  price  of  value  added,  Pv' the  local  price  of input
imported  from  the  convertible  currency  area,  Pml,  where  Pml  is equal  to the
exchange  rate (units  of leva  per  dollar)  times  the  international  price  of  M1
in  dollars,  PMl*  adjusted  by tariffs  (l+t),  Pml=eP*ml(l+t).  The local  price
of the  imported  input  from  the  non-convertible  currency  area  will be Pm2.
Assuming  that  domestic  prices  are set  as a constant  mark-up,  over  unitary
costs  we can  write  down  the  price  equation  as:' 0
(2)  P =  P( Pv,  Pml'  Pm2)
Let  us assume  a Cobb-Douglas  production  function
(1)'  Y  - VAsvMlsmlM,  sm2
where  sv is the share  of value  added  in  output,  aml  is  the share  of input  Ml
in output  and sm2  is the  share  of input  2 in  output. In addition,  sv+  sml
+sm2 =  1.  Now the price equation can be written as a Cobb-Douglas
index
(2)'  p =  PvsvPmllpm2sm2
This expression  shows  that  the  effect  (in  percentage  changes)  of  a
currency  devaluation  on domestic  prices  will be proportional  to the  share  of
M1 in output,  sml.  In turn,  the  impact  of an increase  in the  international
price  of the  input  brought  from  the  CMEA  zone  will  be proportional  to sm2. As
we show  below  those  effects  may be enlarged  if the  price  of  value  added  --  say
10 The  mark-up  is not  explicitly  included  in the  price  equation  since,  by
assumption,  is a constant.19
wages  --  is indexed  to prices.
The  empirical  base for  obtaining  the  direct  and  indirect  cost  components
of prices  is  an input-output  matrix  of Bulgaria  for  1987.  The  methodology  and
the  algebra  of the  construction  of the  price  equations  from  the input-output
table  are  provided  in  the  appendix.
We shall  focus  on four  price  indexes:  the  price  of food  products,  the
price  of non-food  goods,  the  consumption  deflator  and  the  output  deflator.
Starting  with the  price  of food  and  non-food  products. The  Price  of food,  P1
iss
(3)  P1 . Pv0 762 PM,0086 pM20. 151
Price  of non-food,  P2:
(4)  P 2 , p 0.628  pm10-061  p 20.31
Notice  that the  direct  and  indirect  intensity  of imported  inputs  from  the  CMEA
zone  is  higher  -twice  as large-in  the  production  of  non-food  goods  than  in the
production  of food;  on the  other  hand,  the  production  of food  is relatively
more intensive  in the  se  of imported  inputs  from  the  convertible  currency
area.
To compute  the  consumption  deflator,  Pc,we  use  the shares  of food  and
non-food  spending  in total  consumption,  derived  from  the input-output  table.
The  consumption  deflator  expressed  in terms  of  value  added  and  imported  inputs
is:
(5)  Pc  N[Pv 0 . 762 PM10.086  PM20.151]O. 29[p  0.628pm10. 061pM20. 31]0.71
In a  more compact  form:
(6)  Pc= PV  0 666pM10.0 68pm2O.264
Aggregating  the  input  -output  table  into  one sector  and  following  the
same  procedure  used  to compute  P1 and  P2, we can  obtain  an equation  for  the20
output  deflator,  P, (the  net  material  product  in this  case). The expression
is
(7)  p = Pv0. 6 8 Pm 0.0 66P=2 0 . 252
It is interesting  to  note  that  the relative  intensities  of  value  added
and imported  inputs  from  both  the  convertible  currency  area  and the  CMEA  zone
are  quite  similar  for  the  consumption  deflator  as  well as for  the  NMP
deflator.
Table  4, summarizes  the  relative  shares  of the  different  cost  components
for  the  different  price  indexes.1
Table  4.  Bulgaria. Value  Added  and  Imported
Inputs  Shares  in  Unitary  Costs
(percentages)
Value  Imports  of  Imports  of
added  Intermediate  Intermediate
goods  from  goods  from  non-
convertible  convertible
currency  area  currency  area
Food Sector  76.2  8.6  15.1
Non-Food  62.8  6.7  31.0
Sector
Consumption  66.6  6.8  26.4
Deflator
NMP deflator  68.0  6.6  25.2
11 The  concept  of  output  implicit  in  the  construction  of  the  price  indexes
from  the  input-output  matrix  is  the  net  material  product.  Since  the  NMP  excludes
some  services  activities  like  education,  health  and  other  government  services
and these  activities  are relatively  labor-intensive,  the  economy-wide  share  of
labor  in  GDP  would tend  to  be greater  than  the share  of labor  in NMP.21
4.1  Effects  of Currency  Devaluation
The  need to correct  the  external  imbalances  of the  Bulgarian  economy
led  the  authorities  to  devalue  the exchange  rate  with respect  to the  US
dollar. The  exchange  rate  was  adjusted  in  May  1990  from  2.5 leva  per  US
dollar  to 7  leva  per dollar  for  the "auctioning  rate",  and 3 leva  per  US
dollar  for  imports  of  basic  necessities  from  this  area. Estimates  of the
effect  of a nominal  devaluation  of the  leva  of 20X  on  domestic  prices  is
provided  in Table  5  below,  under  the  asoumption  of a fixed  price  of value
added. This amounts,  basically,  to assume  that  the  price  of the  variable
factor  --  labor  --  is  held constant  e.g.,  a constant  nominal  wages. 12 In this
case,  the  impact-effect  of a 20X  devaluation  on  prices  is rather  small,  in the
order  of 1.2  to 1.7  percent,  depending  upon the  price  index  used.  This
clearly  reflects  the small  share  of imported  inputs  from  the  convertible
currency  area  in the  production  structure  of Bulgaria. Turning  to  wage
adjustment,  it is  not unrealistic  to assume  that  workers  will demand  some
increase  in  nominal  wages in  compensation  for  an increase  in the  price  level
following  a devaluation  of the  currency. Moreover,  if a  process  of sustained
inflation  is set  in  motion,  either  because  of accommodative  monetaly  policy
(or  increases  in  the fiscal  deficit  financed  by printing  money),  there  will be
pressures  to establish  some  sort  of  wage indexation  mechanisms  in  Bulgaria. 13
12  Implicitly we assume that the remuneration of capital is
constant.  That assumption will remain thereof.
13  It  is not  a  necessary condition that formal  wage  indexation  be
established  for a dynamic of indexation  be observed, since informal  wage
indexation  may also  take  place  in  a process  of sustained  inflation.22
Typically,  wage indexation  is tied  to a consumer  price  index. 14
The impact  of a ZOX  currency  devaluation  under  different  degrees  of  wage
indexation  is shown  in  the  third  and  fourth  columns  of Table  5.  The  algebra
of indexation  is  as follows. Let  us first  denote  the  rate  of change  in the
variable  x  as g.  - 6x/x ,  and  the  relative  share  in  unitary  costs  of the
factor  j  in sector  i as sji  (see  Table  4).  Equation  (11),  shows  the  rate  of
change  in the  price  of good  i as the  weighted  average  of the rate  of change  in
the  price  of value  added  and  the  rate  of change  in the  price  of imported
inputs  from  both  trade  areas.
(8)  gPi  - OvigPv  +  smligPml  +  sm2igPm2
The  wage indexation  rule  tied  to the  consumption  deflator  (equation  6)
yields:
(9)  gw  - Xgpc  - X(O.666  gw  +  0.068gpm.  +  0.264gpr2)
where  X  is the  degree  of  wage indexation.  Special  cases  are:  r.o-indexation
e.g.,  fix  nominal  wages, t0O  and  full-wage  indexation,  X-1;  partial  indexation
implies  0  < X  <  1.  Further  assumptions  are: (a)  the  rate  of change  in  the
price  of value  added  is equal  to the  rate  of change  in  nominal  wages,  gp  =
gw,  (b)  the rate  of change  in the  domestic  price  of 4 5mported  inputs  from  the
convertible  currency  area  is equal  to the  rate  of devaluation  gpml  get
(implicitly  we are  assuming  both constant  dollar  prices  from  the  convertible
currency  area and  fix  tariffs),  (c)  the  domestic  price  of imported  inputs  from
the  CMEA  zone  is fixed,  gpm2=0. Under  these  assumptions,  we obtain  the
14 For simplicity  we assume that  wages are indexed  to the consumption
deflator  of  the  same  period.  Other  modalities  of  indexation  are  lagged  indexation
(tied  to  the  price  index  of  previous  periods)  or  forward-looking  indexation,  tied
to an  estimate  of future  consumer  prices.23
following  expression  for  the  effect  of a devaluation  of ge  percent  on the
rate  of change  in the  price  of the (composite)  good  i, gpij
(10)  gpi  0  O.068svi/(l- 0.666X)  +  5Pmli I  ge
Notice  that  when nominal  wages  are  fixed,  X  - 0,  the  effect  of the  devaluation
on the  price  index  of (the  composite)  good  i  will be given  by the  share  of
imported  inputs  from  the  convertible  currency  area  in  unitary  costs  of
producing  the  good i,  the  coefficient  spmli. Moreover  the  inflationary  impact
of the  devaluation  will  be large.  the  higher  the  degree  of  wage indexation.In
fact  columns  three  and  four  of Table  5 show  that  the  impact  on  prices  of the
devaluation  of the  leva  is highly  sensitive  to the  degree  of  wage indexation.
Take for  example  the  consumption  deflator:  while  a 20  percent  devaluation
produces  an increase  in  PC of 1.365  percent  in the  absence  of  wage indexation,
the corresponding  price  increase  goes  up to 2.04 percent  with a coefficient
of  wage indexatioa  of 502, 0X  - 0.5),  and  up again  to 3.4  percent  with 90 2 of
indexation,  (  - 0.9).  Similar  results  hold for  the  other  price  indexes.24
Table  5.  Bulgaria. Effect  of a  20Z  Devaluation  of the  Exchange
Rato  (percentages)
Degree  of  No Indexation  Intermediate  High
Wage Indexation  (X  0)  Indexation  Indexation
- 0.5)  - 0.9)
Effect  on:
Price  of Food  1.72  2.49  4.04
P1
Price  of  1.22  1.86  3.14
Non-food
P2 Consumption  1.36  2.04  3.40
Deflator,  PC
Consumer  Price  1.41  2.09  3.48
Index  *
NMP  Deflator,P  1.32  2.01  3.39
Note:  *  In the  consumption  deflator  obtained  from  the  input  -output  table  the
share  of food  is 0.29  and  the  share  of  non-food  is 0.71.  In the  household
expenditures  survey,  HES, of Bulgaria  the  share  of food,  that  includes  a
larger  range  of goods,  is 0.38  and  the  share  of  non-food  is 0.62 (for  '.989).
Assuming  that  the  rate  of change  in the  price  of the  food  and  non-food  items
of the  HES, are  equal  to the  rate  of change  in the  price  of food  and  non-food
of the  I-0  table,  and  using  the  shares  of the  HES,  we can  calculate  the  effect
of the  devaluation  on a consumer  price  index  based  in the  HES.Ir.  general,  the
effect  of the  devaluation  on the  consumption  deflator  and  the  consumer  price
index  differ  very little.25
Two  main conclusions  emerge  from  this  exercise:  First,  given  the
relatively  low  share  of imported  inputs  from  the  convertible  currency  area in
the  unitary  costs  of the  Bulgarian  economy,  the  effect  of a currency
devaluation on prices, --  as determined by costs of production --  may be not
very large;  in particular,  under  the  assumption  of fixed  wages.  Second,  the
introduction  of  wage indexation  schemes  will increase  the  inflationary  effect
of a  nominal  devaluation  and  hence  reduce  its  effect  on the  real  exchange
rate,  because  the second  round  effects  from  increased  wages  as a response  to
the  devaluation.
4.2  Effects  of  an increase  in  the  price  of imported  inputs  from  the  CMEA
Zone
As  mentioned  above  Bulgaria  will face  an increase  in  the  price  of the
goods  imported  from  the  CMEA zone,  particularly  from  the  Soviet  Union.  Thus,
the  price  of oil,  natural  gas,  coal  and  other  raw  materials  that  Bulgaria
imports  from  the  Soviet  Union  are  the  most likely  candidates  to increase. A
similar  methodology  used for  computing  the  effects  of a devaluation  on
internal  prices  will  be used to asses  the  effects  of an increase  in the  price
of imported  inputs  from  the  CMEA  area.  The  only  new  assumption  is  that
domestic  prices  of imported  inputs  from  the  convertible  currency  area  will
remain  unchanged,  gpml-o  (this  implies  that  the  nominal  exchange  rate,
international  prices  in the  convertible  currency  area  and import  tariffs  will
remain  fix).
An expression  that  gives  the  effect  on the  price  index  of the  good  i  of
a percentage  increase  in  the  price  of imported  inputs  from the  CMEA zone  is
given  by26
(11)  gpi  '  0.264Xsvi/(1-0.666X)  +  spm23gpi2
The  magnitude  of the  effect  of an increase  in Pm2  on Pi  will depend,
basically,  on the  share  of imports  of intermediate  goo-s  from  the  CMEA  zone in
the  unitary  costs  of production  of the  good  i and  the  degree  of  wage
indexation  in the  economy. Table  6 provides  the  estimates  of the  effect  of a
202  increase  in Pm2  on various  price  indexes  under  different  degrees  of  wage
indexation  to the  consumer  price  index.
Table  6  Bulgaria--Effects  of a 20X  increase  in the
price  of imported  inputs  from  the  CMEA  area
Degree  of  Wage  No Indexation  Intermediate  High
Indexation  =  0)  Indexation  Indexation
(X  - 0.5)  (X-0.9)
Effect ons
Price  of Food  3.02  6.033  12.05
P1
Price  of  Non-food  6.20  8.67  13.61
P2
Consumption  5.27  7.90  13.15
Deflator,  Pc
Consumer  4.99  7.66  13.01
Price  Index  *
Deflator  5.04  7.27  13.08
NMP, P
Note:  *  see  footnote  in Table  3.27
From Table  6 follows  that  the  domestic  inflationary  effect  of a 20 Z  increase
in the  domestic  price  of imported  inputs  from  the  CMEA is between  two and
three  times  higher  than  the  effect  of an equivalent  devaluation  of the  leva
with respect  to the  dollar,  for  a given  degree  of  wage indexation. This
results  stems  directly  from  the  much  higher  intensity  of inputs  and raw
materials  imported  from  the  CMEA  area  as compared  to the  share  of inputs
imported  from  the  convertible  currency  area.  Remember  that  around  75 percent
of total  trade  of Bulgaria  is  conducted  with the  CMEA,  a proportion  that  also
seems  to  be observed  for  imports  of intermediate  goods. Furthermore,  the
sensitivity  of these  results  to the  degree  of  wage indexation,  is high.  In
particular  in the case  of  high  wage indexation,  )-0.9,  a 20 percent  increase
in Pm2  will come  along  with an increase  in  domestic  prices  in a range  between
12 and  13.5  percent,  certainly  a sizeable  effect  on internal  prices.
5.  The  Determinants  of  Growth  in  the  1980s,  the  Collapse  of 1990,  and  the
Transition  to a  Market  Economy
The  transition  to a  market  economy  will ultimately  succeed  if the
reforms  bring  sustainable  growth  and  an improvement  in  the standard  of living
of the  population. Economic  growth  under  socialism  was historically  rapid
(according  to the  official  statistics)  and  it relied  in the  extensive  use  of
natural  resources,  was capital  intensive  and  a concern  for  efficiency  of
resource  use and  high-quality  goode  was replaced  by a drive  to  meet  quantity
targets. This  section  first  reviews  the  growth  performance  of  Bulgaria  in the
1980s  disentangling  supply  and  demand  factors  in the  explanation  of observed
growth  rates.28
Then the issue  of the  effects  on growth  of the  transition  to capitalism
is dealt  highlighting  micro  and  macro  factors  deemed  to  be important  in this
regard.
5.1  Determinants  of Growth  in the  19809
The  contribution  of capital  accumulation  and  labor  growth  to output
growth  is assessed  as  well as the  contribution  of consumption,  investment  and
exports  on growth  on the  demand  side. In addition,  the  efficiency  of
investment  is reviewed. Finally,  the  impact  of short  term  stabilization  and
the  structural  reforms  towards  a  market  economy  on growth  is discussed. 15
15  The  system of material balances in Centrally -Planned economies
calculates  the Net Material  Product (NMP)  which is net output  generated  in
"material"  activities.  Transport,  commerce  and communication  are included  in
productive  activities  but health, education  and most services  are generally
excluded  from  the  material  sphere  for  calculating  NMP. To convert  NMP figures
into  Gross  Domestic  Product  (GDP)  the  following  adjustments  have to  be  made:(i)
the  value  added created  in the  non-material  sphere  is added  to NMP, (ii)  the
value  of non-material  output  consumed  in the  material  sphere  is subtracted  to
avoid  double-counting,  (iii)  depreciation  exclusive  of  capital  repair,  is added
the latter  being considered  a current  expenditure  in the system  of national
accounts  but  a  capital  expenditure  in  the  system  of  material  balances.  Typically,
GDP to  NMP ratios  are  in the order  of 1.15  to 1.53  and  tend to rise  over time
with the  relative  expansion  of the  service  sector.29
Table  7.  Economic  Growth  in Bulgaria
(rate  of growth,  percentages)
GDP  Agriculture  Industry  Services
1981  4.90  4.47  5.47  4.10
1982  2.30  5.79  9.3  - 12.66
1983  3.40  - 16.34  7.64  7.28
1984  3.40  11.68  6.13  - 7.44
1985  2.70  - 20.62  5.09  11.35
1986  4.20  22.04  5.19  - 6.50
1987  6.10  - 14.v4  5.37  20.48
1988  2.60  - 1.71  2.43  4.92
1989  - 1.90  - 2.36  0.33  - 5.44
1990*  -10.0
annual
averages  3.07  - 1.29  5.22  1.78
Source:  World  Bank.
*  Estimate.
Table  7 shows  that  during  the 1980s  GDP  decelerated  its  rate  of growth.
On average  the  annual  rate  of growth  of GDP (1981-89)  was 3.07;  over  one
percentage  point  less  than  the  4.3  percent  growth  of GNP in the  period  1971-
80.  At a sectoral  level,  the  driving  sector  behind  growth  was industry  --  a
sector  with a share  in GDP  of 61 percent  --  with an annual  average  rate  of
growth  of 5.22  Z in the  period  1981-89. The  performance  of agriculture  in
that  period  was dismal  with negative  average  annual  growth. The  growth  record
of the  service  sector  in  the  1980s  has been rather  modest:  its  growth  rate30
fell  below  the  growth  rate  of industry  (and  GDP)  but it  was above  that  of
agriculture.
To gain  a better  understanding  on the  sources  of growth  in Bulgaria  let
us calculate  the  contribution  of labor  and  capital  to  measured  growth. The
following  equation  for  the  rate  of GDP  growth  is  useful  in this respects
Syly  - h 514K  +  (1-h)  6LIL  +  e
where,  h  is the  share  of capital  in  va'tIu  added  and  1-h  is the  share  of
labor,  Ochcl. The rate  of growth  of GDP  is denoted  by 6y/y.  the  rate  of
growth  of capital  is  given  by 54KI  and  the  rate  of growth  of labor  is  6LIL.
The term  e  represents  the  residual,  namely  the  rate  of growth  of output  that
is  not  explained  by capital  accumulation  and  employment  growth. This term  is
often  imputed  as technical  progress  but it could  also reflect  measurements
problems  both in  the  aggregation  of output  and  in the  quality  of the  factors
of  production.31
Table  8.  Economic  Growth  in  the  1980,s  the  Role  of Labor
and  Capital  Accumulation 10
(annual  averages,percentages)
rate  of growth  2.370
of capital




percentage  points  1.232
percent  of total  40.93
contribution  of
labor  growth  :
percentage  points  0.141
percent  of total  4.70
residual  1.63
rate  of growth
of GDP  3.07
Note:  the  share  of capital  is 0.52  and  that  of labor  is 0.48. They
were obtained  from  the  input-output  table.
The results  skow several  interesting  results  regarding  the  sources  of
growth  in Bulgaria  in the  1980s. First,  it is  clear  the  overwhelming  relative
importance  of capital  accumulation,  as compared  to labor  growth,  in explaining
GDP growth  in this  period. Around  40Z  of GDP  growth  is explained  by capital
16 The  rate  of growth  of capital  was calculated  as the  product  of average
net investment  ratio  over  GDP  divided  by the  capital-output  ratio.  The  rate  of
growth  of labor  corresponds  to the  rate  of growth  of total  employment.32
accumulation.  Second,  the  very low  contribution  of labor  growth  to total
growth  is  due  mainly  to the  very low  rate  of growth  of employment  ,  0.295
percent  per  year (the  annual  rate  of growth  of population  in Bulgaria  is
around  0.4  percent). 17 Third,  the size  of the  unexplained  residual,  1.63Z  per
year,  as a  percentage  of output  growth  explained  near a  half of real  growth. 18
However,  we have to  be careful  in inferring  that  the rate  of technical  change
is large  in  Bulgaria  from  this  value  of the  residual. As mentioned  before  the
residual  could  be substantially  reduced  if factor  inputs  could  be measured
more precisely. In  particular  the  measure  of aggregate  capital  conceal
different  vintages  of capital  equipment  that  may  have different  marginal
productivities.  Another  extension  of the  analysis  would  be to distinguish
between  human  capital  and  unskilled  labor. Furthermore,  the  data  on output
may reflect  index  numbers  problems  since  prices  do not  reflect  relative
scarcities  of goods  and  productive  factors.
Given  the  importance  of capital  accumulation  in the  growth  process  it
seems  useful  to examine  some  features  of investment  and  particularly  assess,
in a first  approximation,  the  efficiency  of investment.
17  In  the  methodology  of sources  of  growth  another  cause  of  low  contribution
of labor,  besides  a slow  rate  of growth  of employment,  would  be a low  marginal
productivity  of labor.  However  in a socialist  economy,  real  wages can  not be
assumed  to  be equal  to  the  marginal  productivity  of  labor  so  this  effect  is  hard
to  measure.
18 Empirical studies  using the sources of growth  methodology  in non-
socialist  developing  countries,  have found  that,  on  average,  technical  progress
accounts  between  1/2  and  1/3  of real  growth.33
Table  9.  Bulgaria  Investment  rates  1979-88
(share  of GDP,  percentages)
Net  Fixed  Capital  Formation  10.80
Depreciation  13.90
Unfinished  Construction  2.20
Gross  Fixed  Capital  Formation  26.90
Changes  in Inventories  6.80
Gross  Investment  33.70
(Index)
Incremental  Capital-Output  Ratio  3.51
Average  Capital-Output  Ratio  4.47
Notes  the incremental  -output  ratio  is calculated  as the  quotient
between  net investment  and  GDP  growth.
Table  9 illustrates  some  interesting  features  of the  investment  process  in
Bulgaria. Gross  investment  is very  high, (33.7  percent  on average  for  the
period  1981-89  and  it  was even  higher  in previous  periods),  to sustain  a rate
of growth  of GDP  of around  3 percent 19. Computing  both  ICOR's  --  the  ratio  of
net investment  over the  rate  of growth  of GDP  --  and  the  capital-output  ratio
--  the  inverse  of average  capital  productivity  --  both  ratios  yield  high
values,  at least  for  the  standards  of non-socialist  economies. This supports
the  notion  of a rather  low  level  of investment  efficiency  in  Bulgaria.
Moreover,  it is interesting  to  mention  the  very  high inventory  accumulation
19 These high investment  ratios  are by no means unusual in socialist
economies,  see  Solimano  (1990a).34
purported  by the  data. On average  for  a period  of 9  years  the  accumulation  of
inventories  represented  near 7 percent  of GDP.  This  needs  to be explained. A
possible  explanation  lies  in the  production  of defects  or low  quality  goods
that  cannot  be sold  in the  market;  it also  may represent  delays  into  putting
capital  goods  in the  production  process. Given  the  rigidities  of the  planning
system  any self  correcting  mechanism  to reduce  the  degree  of inventory
accumulation  will operate  in a  weak  way.
To sum-up,  discrepancies  between  investment  expenditure  and  additions  to
the  capital  stock,  an important  factor  behind  poor investment  efficiency,
develop  as  many investment  projects  are  never  completed,  new  equipment  is  not
brought  into  operation,  and remains  as inventoricw  and imports  of capital
goods  from  the  West do not represent  the  most  up-to-date  equipment  (see  CEPR,
1990).35
Table  10.  Economic  Growth  in the  19808:  A Demand  Decomposition
(average  annual  rates  of growth,  percentages)
1981-1989
Total  Consumption  3.29
-Private  Consumption  2.40
-Public  Consumption  5.10
Gross  Investment  2.79
Total  Exports  6.28
-to convertible  area  5.25
-to  non  convertible  area  6.86
Total  Imports  5.44
-from  convertible  area  7.83
-from  non-convertible  area  2.02
GDP  3.07
On the  demand  side  public  consumption  and  exports  to the  non-convertible
currency  area  drove  growth  in  the  1980s. Investment  grew  at a slower  pace
than  GDP leading  to a reduction  in  the  investment  share,  (though  it is still
very  high).  Imports,  in  dollars  have  been  growing  at a  higher  rate  than  GDP
and  exports  thus enlarging  the (convertible  currency)  trade  deficit.
Regarding  trade  with socialist  countries,  exports  to that  area  grew  almost
three  times  more rapid  than  imports.
5.2  Transitional  Issues:
A  key objective  in the  transition  from  central  planning  is to  make
relative  prices  and decentralized  markets  to play  a  major  role  in supply36
decisions. At a macro  level,  getting  output  response  from  changes  in relative
prices  is  particularly  useful  as it  would  ease  the  costs  of the transition.
Two  complications  for  a sizeable  supply  response  are  likely  to arise  at a
microeconomic  and  sectoral  level:  the  first  is that  just  a (very  small)
fraction  of firms  operate  in a regime  of binding  budget  constraints  and  their
objective  function  is to  maximize  profits  --or  minimize  costs  --  so that  we
can  expect  their  supply  decisions  to  be price-dependent.  The second
complication  refars  to  the fact  that  price  deregulation  may lead  to a drop ir.
output  when the  market  structure  is  characterized  by firms  which  have  market
power  e.g.,  monopollv# 4 . competition. 20
The  coexistence  of a;  A-  ;et  constrained  (optimizing)  firms  with soft  budget
constrained  firms.
In  Bulgaria  large  segments  of the  enterprise  sector  still  operates  under
a regime  of soft  budget  constraint  in the  socialized  sector. In the  regime  of
soft  budget  constraints,  if the  firm  requires  more inputs  (including  credit)
to  meet the  targetr  of physical  production,  the  firms  will get  those  inputs  at
no extre.  cost (e.g.,  firms  are  not  budget  constrained).  Thus,  the  level  of
output  of the  traditional  socialist  firm  can  be expected  to  be largely
insensitive  to changes  in relative  prices  or in  market  profitability.
On the  other  hand,  private  (or  public)  firms  that  maximize  profits  (or
minimize  costs)  subject  to a  hard  budget  constraint  are  expected  to react  to
prices. 21 Formally,  the aggregate  level  of output,  y,  will be a function  of
20 I owe  this  point  to Paul  Krugman.
21  The  price-elasticity  of  supply  depends  on technological  parameters,  the
time  period  of  the  production  process  and  in  a  context  of  uncertainty  on  the  mean
and  variance  of the  distribution  of relative  prices  faced  by the  firm.37
the  level  of  output  produced  by  the  set  of  optimizing-budget  constrained
firms,  yo,  whose  supply  function  can  be  written  as  yo  - pa where  the
coefficient  a  denotes  the  price  elasticity  of  supply.  In  turn,  the
(aggregate)  level  of  output  of  the  set  of  soft-budget  constrained  firms  is
denoted  by  ys  and  is  independent  of  p.
Then,  y  - #(Yo# Ye)
Assuming  that  the  function  #  is  Cobb-Douglas  with  shares  b  and  1-b,  we
can  write  the  aggregate  supply  function  of  the  economy  as
yu(pa)b(ye)l-b  where 0  <  b<  1.
The  price  elasticity  of  aggregate  supply  is  -
6logy/61ogp  - ba
Then  the  output  response  to  a  change  in  relative  prices  in  the  aggregate
depends  on  two  parameterst(i)  the  share  of  sectors  in  the  economy  that  are
subject  to  a  binding  budget  constraint  and  optimize  an  objective  function,  the
coefficient  b,  and  (ii)  the  price  elasticity  of  the  aggregate  supply  of  the
hard  budget  constraint  sectors.  Clearly,  the  rules  of  operations  cf  public
enterprises  and  the  relative  importance  of  the  private  sector  as  producers  (in
Bulgaria  nowadays  the  private  sector  contributes  just  to  3  percent  of  GDP)  are
important  elements  behind  the  supply  response  to  changes  in  relatives  prices.
Furthermore,  it  is  worth  to  keep  in  mind  that  privatization  has  an  important
role  to  play  in  introducing  market  discipline  to  enterprises..38
Deregulating  Prices  in  a Monopolistic  Setting
The  market  structure  is  also important  for  the  output  response  to
changes  in relative  prices. In centrally-planned  economies  the  most frequent
disequilibrium  in the  goods  market  is  excess  demand. Then  the standard  recipe
is  price  liberalization  supplemented  by tight  demand  policies. Let examine
the  case in  which  price  deregulation  takes  place  in  a  setting  of monopolistic
competition,  where  every  firm  enjoys  some  market  power. The  market
equilibrium  is represented  in  Figure  3  where  on the  vertical  axis  we have the
relative  price  Pi/P  which  represents  the  ratio  between  the  price  Pi the
monopolistic  producer  charges  over  average  prices  P.  In symmetric  equilibrium
Pi  - P.  On the  horizontal  axis  we have the  quantity  of the  good,  Qi.  The
downward  demand  curve  facing  producer  i is  given  by D(Pi/P,  MIP)  where  M/P
denotes  the  stock  of real  balances. The  upward  sloping  curve  MC is the
marginal  cost  schedule  of  producer  i  and  the  negatively  sloped  schedule  MR is
the  marginal  revenue. The *old*  equilibrium  will be associated  with a price
Pj/P  - 1  where firms  cannot  raise  their  prices. In turn,  at that  price  ratio
firms  produces  at  QiO,  wlth excess  demand,  (Qid  >  Qc)'  generating  a black
market  premium  and  rents.
Now as  part of the  liberalization  program,  prices  are  deregulated  and
firms  are  allowed  to rise  their  prices. The increase  in  the  price  level  will
reduce  the  stock  of real  balances  shifting  the  demand  curve  down to  the  point
where the  firm  setting  its  optimal  price  ends  up charging  P.  Therefore  at the
new  equilibrium  --  under  deregulated  prices  --  the  new level  of outpul  Qin
(given  by the intersection  of  MC with the  new  marginal  revenue  schedule
associated  to  Dn)  which is lower  than  the  initial  level  of output  under39
regulated  prices. 0. course,  the  point  must be not  overstated  since  there
were shortages  at  the "old' equilibrium  and  consumers  paid  an additional
implicit  price  in terms  of searching  costs  to get  the  goods  they  desire
besides  the "unproductive"  rent-seeking  involved  in  the  initial  situation
characterized  by shortages. Anyway  a  main  message  from  this exercise  is  that
free  prices  under  monopolistic  competition  might  not  be  welfare  improving.40
Figure  3.  Price  Deregulation  under  Monopolistic  Cormetition
D(M, P,)
lRaN  ~DN  (H/PN)
QiN  Qio  Qi
5.3  The  Collapse  of Economic  Activity  in 1990  and  other  Transitional  Effects
on Growth
The large  contraction  in  economic  activity  developed  in 1990  was closely
related  to supply  shocks  like:  (i)  the  disruption  of deliveries  of oil from
the  Soviet  Union  and Iraq;  (ii)  the  shortages  of domestic  inputs  because  of
the  breakdown  of distribution  networks  associated  with the  collapse  of central
planning;  and (iii)  the loss  of export  markets  in the  Middle-East  and  the
contraction  of the Soviet  and  CMEA  Markets. Regarding  the  effects  of the
transition  from  central  planning  on the  rate  of growth  in the  short  to  medium
run,  several  effects  are relevant. A first  channel  is linked  to the
correction  of large  macroeconomic  imbalances  observed  in Bulgaria. The
running  of large  deficits  in the  current  account  with the  convertible  currency41
area  and  the  existence  of serious  inflationary  pressures  call  for  tight  demand
policies  that  may decelerate  growth  in  the short  run (since  1989  GDP growth  is
negative). Cooling  down growth  in aggregate  spending  tends  to ease  the
inflationary  pressures  on the  demand  side. 22 Then,  the system  is likely  to
pass from  being  supply  constrained  to  become  dema,.d  constrained.
A second  channel  through  which  the  transition  from  central  planning  may
affect  growth  is through  changes  in relative  prices  and  incentives  that  make
part of the  existing  capital  stock  (and  skills  of the  labor  force)
economically  obsolete. Then if  Bulgaria  under  the  CMEA  arrangements  was
concentrated  in producing,  say,  machinery  for  heavy  industry  and  computers  to
be sold  in the  Soviet  Union  in exchange  for  oil  and  raw  materials,  now it  will
have to concentrate  in developing  the  production  with an outlet  in  western
markets,  e.g.,  wine, fruit  and light  industry. During  the  transition  period
it is clear  that  part  of the  capital  stock  used  to  produce  the Hold"  goods
will  be inappropriate  to produce  the 'new'  goods. That  will adversely  affect
the  level  of output  and  perhaps  its  rate  of growth  in the short-term. 23
A third  set  of factors  relates  with the  response  of investment  to the
new structure  of incentives  that  is  expected  to emerge  from  the  reform
process. The  basic  argument  for  expecting  an initial  weak investment  response
in the  aggregate  stems  in two  elements:  first,  the  process  of reform  is
characterized  by systemic  uncertainty  as  the final  fate  of the reform  process
22 This  should  be qualified,  however,  since  a reduction  in real  growth  may
worsen  the  fiscal  deficit  by reducing  seigniorage.  This  can  be an  inflationary
shock.
23  The  improvement  in  efficiency  of  resource  use  may  counteract  part  of  this
effect.  The composition  of investment  may become  more efficient  and that  may
speed  up growth  in the  medium  term (see  Easterly,  1990).42
is  unknown.  Under  these  conditions,  the rational  investor  has large  incentives
to  wait or delay  its  investment  decisions  until  the  level  of perceived
uncertainty  is reduced. A second  element  for  a quantitatively  small
investment  response  in  the  aggregate  is  the  fact that  the  private  sector  in
Bulgaria  is  extremely  small  and  probably  inexperienced  in the  rules  of
operation  of a  market  economy,  something  that  can  be reversed  with
privatization  over  the  medium  run. Additional  complications  for  an adequate
investment  response  relate  tos (i)  the  lack  of a legal  setting  that  define  and
protect  property  rights,  (ii)  the  absence  of  well-developed  capital  markets
that  provide  adequate  financing  for  p..ofitable  investment  opportunities,  and
(iii)  the lack  of  modern  infrastructure  in  terms  of roads  and
telecommunications.
Last,  but  not least,  Bulgaria  needs  additional  external  financing  to
support  sound  investment  and  modernize  its  productive  structure. A major
obstacle  in this regard  is the foreign  debt  overhang. Then  a solution  to the
foreign  debt  problem  and  the  possibilities  of getting  new external  financing
are  closely  linked  issues. Finally,  direct  foreign  investment  could  be amply
welcomed  as it  would  bring  new technologies  and  managerial  capabilities  and
access  to  new external  markets.
6.  Final  Remarks
The shaky  macroeconomic  situation  of Bulgaria  is a serious  obstacle  for
a smooth  transition  from  central  planning  to a  market  based  economy. The
correction  of large  current  account  deficits  with the  convertible  currency
area,  the  elimination  of inflationary  pressures  and large  price  distortions
and a resumption  of sustainable  growth  in the  context  of structural  change  are43
the  key  issues  in  the  policy  agenda  for  Bulgaria.
This  paper  examined  both  analytically  and  empirically  several  issues
associated  with  stabilization  and  growth  in  the  transition  from  socialism  in
Bulgaria.
The  links  between  inflation,  money  velocity  the  money  overhang  and  the
fiscal  deficit  are  of  crucial  importance  for  assessing  probable  inflationary
trends  in  Bulgaria.  It  is  shown  that  in  a context  of  controlled  prices  and
financial  repression,  low  velocity  contributes  to  maintain  inflation  at  an
artificially  low  level  in  spite  of  large  fiscal  deficits.  However  as  prices
are  deregulated  and  the  financial  sector  is  reformed,  velocity  may  be  expected
to  increase  due  to  both  expectations  of  increased  inflation  and/or  financial
innovation.  In  that  context  the  rate  of  inflation  may  jump  to  high  levels  and
perhaps  a  protracted  process  of  inflation  set-in  with  monetary  accommodation,
wage  indexation  and  lack  of  fiscal  adjustment  in  the  background.
Stabilization  and  the  setting  of  fiscal  targets  eonsistent  with  low  inflation
becomes  a  complex  task  provided  the  inscability  of  the  demand  for  money  in  a
context  of  uncertain  stabilization  and  financial  innovation.
Using  empirical,  cost-determined,  price  equations  we  explore  the  effects
on  domestic  prices  of  a  devaluation  of  the  leva  and  an  increase  in  the  price
of  foreign  inputs  imported  from  the  Soviet  Union  and  other  CHEA  countries,  two
price  shocks  underway  (besides  also  the  impact  of  the  Gulf  crisis  on  oil
prices  in  international  markets).  The  empirical  results  show,  that  the  input
price  shock  has  a  more  important  quantitative  effect  on  internal  prices  than
an (equivalent)  devaluation.  This  result  arise  from  the  greater  (relative)
reliance  on  inputs  imported  trom  the  CMEA  zone  than  from  the  convertible
currency  area. The  introduction  of  wage  indexation  in  the  wake  of  price44
adjustment  measures  is shown  to exacerbate  sharply  the  effects  on domestic
prices  from  devaluation  and/or  the  external  price  shocks.
The supply  response  to changes  in relative  prices  and  the  introduction
of  market  incentives  is likely  to face  at least  two  major  problems  at a micro
level. First,  the  rules  of operation  of firms  in the  productive  sphere  is
still  largely  dominated  by the  socialized  sector  of enterprises  operating
under  a regime  of soft  budget  constraints,  with the  ensuing  little  price
responsiveness.  Second,  it is shown  that in  a setting  of  monopolistic
competition.  where individual  firms  have  considerable  market  power,  full  price
deregulation  may  bring  about  a drop in  output.
Economic  growth  in Bulgaria  decelerated  sharply  in the  1980s  and
completely  collapsed  in 1990. A factor  decomposition  exercise  shows  that  GDP
growth  was explained  mainly  by capital  accumulation  (40  percent)  and  the
residual  (53  percent)  with a  very little  contribution  of labor  growth.  From
the  demand  side,  growth  has been  driven  mainly  by public  consumption  and
exports  to the  non-convertible  currency  area. Moreover,  the  collapse  of
economic  activity  in  1990 is  closely  related  to the  cut in  oil  deliveries  from
the  Soviet  Union  and  Iraq,  the interruptions  in tha  supply  of intermediate  and
capital  goods  associated  with the  dismantling  of central  planning  and  the loss
in  export  markets  in the  Middle-East  and the  contraction  of the  Soviet  market.
The transition  to a  market  economy  is likely  to affect  growth  through
several  channels. The  correction  of macroeconomic  imbalances  --  involving  a
cut in imports  and  a cooling  down  of aggregate  demand  to  dampen  inflationary
pressures  --  tends  to generate  a contraction  in  aggregate  economic  activity.
The  structural  reforms  that  will alter  the  incentive  structure  will
render  part  of the  existing  capital  stock  .--  shaped  by the  economic  structure45
of central  planning  and  the  division  of labor  imposed  by the  CMEA  trade
arrangements  --  as economically  obsolete  therefore  hampering  productive
capacity  in  the short  run.  The  response  of  private  investment  to the  new
incentives  will be highly  sensitive  to the  degree  of macroeconomic  stability
and  the  perceived  probability  that  the  reform  process  will last  and
consolidate. Otherwise  it  becomes  rational  for  the  private  investor  to  wait -
- an option  with a  high  premium  in an  unstable  environment  --  therefore
delaying  the  resumption  of growth. Finally,  external  support  in the  form  of
new financing  and  direct  investment  will  necessarily  play  also  a major  role  in
helping  consolidate  the  reform  process  and  help in  the resumption  of growth.46
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APPENDIX
Construction  of Price  Equations  from  the  Input-Output  Table
As it is  well known  the  input  -output  table  provides  a breakdown  of  both
the  intermediate  and final  demands  for  the  goods  produced  by each sector  of
economic  activity  as  well as the  cost  structure  in terms  of  purchases  of
intermediate  goods,  value  added  and  imports  of intermediate  goods  used  in each
sector's  production. 24
Table  A.1.  provides  an input-output,  1-0,  table  for  Bulgaria  at  millions
of  1987  leva (the  local  currency). The  sectors  of economic  activity  are
aggregated  in twos  the "food  sector,  and the "non-food  sector'. The  food
sector  corresponds  to industry  017  of food,  beverages  and  tobacco;  the  non-
food  sector  corresponds  to the  rest.  In terms  of demand  for  final  consumption
the food  sector  comprises  29 percent  of total  consumption  expenditure  in the
economy. With this  share (and  that  of  non-food)  we can  construct  a deflator
for  consumption. In turn  an output  deflator  (for  Net  Material  Product)  will
be also  computed  ix  terms  of its  cost  c,mponents  from  the  input-output  table.
Reading  across  a row  in the  1-0  table  we can  obtain  the following
material  balances  linking  output  supply  with intermediate  and final  demands.
In  matrix  forms
(1)  X - AX + p
24 The underlying  technology  in the input-output  table is that of f  ix-
proportions.  This is not an overly  restrictive  assumption  for  Bulgaria,  still
a centrally  planned  economy  -though  starting  a period  of transformation-  and
where  the response  of the factor  mix to changes  in factor  prices  is very  weak
if it does  exist  at all.48
The column  vector  X denotes  the  level  of production  for  the  two  sectorst
the food  sector  X1 and  the  non-food  sector  X2 the  aij elements  of the  square
matrix  A (of  order  2x2)  are  the  input-output  coefficients  showing  the
intermediate  sales  from  sector  i to sector  j  for  ij  -{1,2}. The  components
F1 and  F2 are  the  final  demands  (consumption,  investment  and  net exports)  for
food  and  non-food  output.
Reading  across  a column  we can  obtain  the  following  decomposition  of
cost  per  unit  of output  in sector  is
(2)  Pi  - £  aji  Pj  + ViPv  + mmliPm.  +  m2iPm2
The  variable  Pi is  the  cost  determined  output  price  in sector  i,  Pv is
the  price  of value  added ,  Pm, is  the  price  in local  cur:ency  (leva)  of
intermediate  goods  imported  from  the  convertible  currency  area.  This  price
can  be  written  as PM,  - eP*(l+t)  where  e is the  exchange  rate (units  of leva
per  US dollar),  P  * is  the international  price,  in  dollars,  of inputs  imported
from  the  convertible  currency  area and  t is the  ad-valorem  tariff  rate.  The
price  Pm2 is the  domestic  price  of foreign  inputs  purchased  in the  CMEA  zone.
The  coefticient  vi is the  amount  of 'ralue  added  required  to  produce  one  unit
of good i, the  coefficient  mli is the  amour.t  of intermediate  imports  from  the
convertible  currency  area  required  to  produce  one  unit of good  i, and  m2i is






Food  all  a12
(0.247)  (0.118)
Non-Food  a2l  a22
(0.069)  (0.461)
Value  Added  vl  V2
(0.183)  (0.303)
imports  from




Non-Convertible  m21 m22
Currency  Area
(0.028)  (0.120)
Table  A.2.  provides  the  input-output  coefficients  required  to parameterize
equation  (2)  with the  information  provided  by the  input-output  table.50
Equation  (2)  as it stands,  shows direct  unitary  costs  in terts  of value
added  and  imported  inputs  (from  both  trade  areas),  and the  costs  of
intermediate  purchases,  of producing  a  unit of the  composite  good i.  To
obtain  the  direct  and  indirect  unitary  costs  in terms  of primary  factors  and
imported  inputs  we need some  transformations.  Restating  equation  (2)  in
matrix  form,  we get (see  Taylor,  1979):
(3)  PT(I-A)  =  PvvT  +  P1m 1T +Pmm2
T
The  term  PT  is a row  vector  of the  price  of food  and  non-food  output e.g.,
pT.1p 1 P2]; vT,  mjT,and  m2T are  row  vectors  of coefficients  of value  added-
output  and imported  inputs-output.  Inverting  the  matrix (I-A),  the  so-called
Leontieff  inverse,  we obtain: 25
(4)  PT * (PvvT  +  Pm 1 m1T  +  Pm2m 2T][I-A]-l
Equation  (4)  shows  the  direct  and  indirect  cost  per  unit  of output  of both
sectors  (food  and  non-food)  in terms  of  value  added  and  imported  inputs  from
both the  cornvertible  currency  area  and  the  non-convertible  currency  zone. For
example,  in the  case  of food  production,  it adds-up  the  content  of  value
added  and  imported  inputs  used  directly  in the  production  of  one  unit of food
and  the  content  of  value  added  and imported  inputs  used  in the  production  of
domestic  goods  that  enter  as intermediate  goods  in the  production  of food
(indirect  component).
25  pT is  conformable  of order  1x2,  the  first  right  hand side  row  vector  in
(4)  is of order  lx2 ,  and  the  matrix  (I-A]  is of order  2x2.51
Using  the  coefficients  calculated  in table  2, and  inverting  the  matrix
1I-A]  we can  apply  equation  (4)  and  weite  the  price  of food  and  non-food  just
as a function  of Pv  and  Pm 5 and  Pm2 (direct  and  indirect  unitary  costs).
Then  the  price  of food  is s
(5)  P1 - 0.301  Pv  +  0.034  Pml  +  0.06  Pm2
The  price  of non-food  is
(6)  P2 - 0.628  PV  +  0.061  Pml  +  0.31  Pm2
Nevertheless,  the  parameters  of Pv and  the  Pmi  are  inputs-outputs  coeffici3nts
and therefore  they  are  not  unit -free. To get  the  relative  shares  of each
cost  component  we adopt  the  normalization  Pv  - PM,  - PM2  -1 ,  then  compute
the  sum  of unitary  costs  and  get  the  corresponding  relative  shares. Note  that
the  resulting  relative  shares  will be completely  independent  of the  units  at
which  factor  prices,  Pv and  Pmj  are  measured  in  the  normalization.PRE  Working  Papsr  Series
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